Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

B.A.M. Development, L.L.C., a limited liability
company v. Salt Lake County, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen G. Homer; Attorney for Appellant.
David E. Yocom; District Attorney for Salt Lake County; Don Hansen; Deputy District Attorney;
Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, B.A.M. Development v. Salt Lake County, No. 20010840 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3530

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a limited liability company,

Appellate Court No.
Trial Court Civil No.

200108040-CA

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the State of Utah,

PriorityNo. 15

Defendants and Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R HANSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

David E. Yocom
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Don Hansen
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
2001 South State Street, No. S3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1200
Stephen G. Homer, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan UT 84088

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a limited liability company,

Appellate Court No.
Trial Court Civil No.

200108040-CA

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the State of Utah,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R HANSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

David E. Yocom
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Don Hansen
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
2001 South State Street, No. S3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190-1200
Stephen G. Homer, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan UT 84088

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

6

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

6

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6
8

1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below

8

2. Statement of Facts

10

SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT
1.
If BAM's Constitutional Challenge to the County Ordinance is Treated as a
"Facial" Challenge, BAM Has not Meet the Heightened Standard Applied to
a Facial Challenge to a Municipal Ordinance
13
2.
If BAM's Challenge is Treated as an "As-Applied" Challenge, then the Only
Issue which BAM Made Ripe for Adjudication by the District Court was
Whether the County's Increased Requirement of a 53-foot Highway
Dedication, Rather Than a 40-foot Dedication, Effected a Constitutional
"Taking"
17
3

No Unconstitutional "Taking" of Private Property Without Just Compensation
Occurred in This Case; The "Takings" Analyses Applied in the Supreme
Court's
Nollan and Dolan Cases are not Applicable in this
Case
22
(A)

Utah's Statutory Scheme for County Regulation of Subdivision
Development
22

Page 2 of 44

4.

(B)

The County Subdivision and Highway Dedication Ordinances are a
Valid Police Power Land-Use Regulation, Not a "Taking"
25

(C)

BAM's Reliance on Two State Statutes in Misplaced

34

No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution,
or the "Uniform Operation of Laws" Clause of the Utah Constitution,
Occurred in this Case
35

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981)

26

Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001)

36

Catty. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d217 (1979)

26

Callv. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (1980)

26

Dolanv. City of Tigard,5l2U.S. 37 A,114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994)

7,17,26

Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996)

30

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915)

15

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, AAA U.S. 164, 175, 110 S.Ct. 383 (1979)

32

Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 634 F. Supp. 100 (1986)

18

Little America Hotel Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 785 P.2d 1106 (1989)

39

Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)

14

Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987)
Page 3 of 44

26

Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.1987)

15

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, et. al, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 533 U.S. 606,
150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)

17

Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978)

32

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed. 815 (1984)

32

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,
27 Cal.4* 643,117 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002)
Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 79 Cal.App.3d 439,

29

144 CaLRptr. 776 (1978)

15

Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

7, 14-17

Southeast Cass Water Resource District v. Burlington Northern Railroad,
527 NW 884 (N.Dakota 1995

32

State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000)

34

State v. Pecht, 441 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 2002)

34

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)

7, 15

William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir.1979).... 15
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)

18

Statutes and Ordinances;
Utah Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(1)
Utah Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(3) (b)
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-102

20
Page 4 of 44

20
23

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801

23

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-807

23

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-36-101, et. seq

35

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90-1, et. seq

35

Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 18.08.010

23,24

Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 15.28.010

24,28,31

Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 18.24.010

21

Utah Const., Art. 1, Sec. 24

39

Page 5 of 44

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court correctly determine that the only issue which BAM
appealed to the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, and thus made "ripe" for
adjudication by the court having been preserved by exhaustion of remedies, was whether the
County's requirement of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40-foot dedication,
effected an constitutional "taking"?
ISSUE NO. 2.: Did the trial court correctly determine that no unconstitutional "taking"
of private property without just compensation occurred in this case under the United States or
Utah constitutions where a municipal highway dedication ordinance required dedication of
property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive transportation scheme, and that the "takings"
analyses applied in the Nollan and Dolan cases regarding "exactions" are not applicable in a
case such as this?
ISSUE NO. 3.: Did the trial court correctly determine that no violation of the Equal
Protection clause of the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause
of the Utah Constitution, occurred in this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The County agrees with BAM's authorities on the general standard of review.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4. Additionally, in a facial constitutional challenge, a municipal
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ordinance withstands constitutional attack if it "debatably promotes the legitimate
[governmental] goals of increased public health, safety, or general welfare." Smith Investment
Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245,253 (Utah Ct. Apps. 1998); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365,388,47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926). A facial takings challenge must show that
a municipal regulation does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." Dolan v. City
ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385, 114 S.Ct. 2309,2316 (1994)(citation omitted).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(a)
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-807
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-36-101, et. seq..
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90-1, et. seq.
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 18.08.010
Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances Sec. 15.28.010
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below

NATURE OF THE CASE:
This case involves claims asserted by Plaintiff/Appellant B.A.M. Development, LLC
[hereinafter, "BAM"], a subdivision developer, that Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake County
[hereinafter, the "County"] violated BAM's constitutional guarantees ofjust compensation for
"takings" of private property, and of "equal protection" by requiring an "exaction" of a certain
area of BAM's property where it adjoins a highway as a condition of the county's approval of
a proposed subdivision plan, to-wit: a dedication of certain road width as needed to comply with
the County's highway width ordinance. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment
against BAM on all claims. BAM now appeals.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
•

August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1 - 13].

•

April 23 and 24, 2001 - Case was tried in a bench trial before Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson [R. 353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)].

•

May 21, 2001 - Closing argument heard by Judge Hanson [R. 355].

•

June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor of
the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, and directing the
County's counsel to prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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[R. 247 - 252].
•

July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding that
(a) BAM's counsel had not timely objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law submitted to the court by the County's counsel; and (b) the
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted to the court by the
County's counsel fairly and accurately represented the court's decision. [R. 258 259]. The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law [R. 266 -273], and its Judgment for Defendant [R. 274 - 275].

•

August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for Entry
of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R. 276 - 279]
along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R. 280 - 291].

•

August 16, 2001 - The County filed its memoranda in opposition to BAM's
Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for New Trial
[R. 292 - 328].

•

September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying
BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for
New Trial for the reasons set forth in the County's August 16, 2001 opposition
memoranda, and directed the County's counsel to prepare a proposed Order to
effectuate the denial of BAM's motions [R. 335- 337].

•

October 15,2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for Entry

Page 9 of 44

of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340].
•

October 18, 2002 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and Bond for Costs on Appeal
[R. 341-344].

•

December 24, 2001 - Utah Supreme Court entered Order transferring appeal to
Utah Court of Appeals [R. 346].

2.

Statement of Facts1

On July 30,1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the application
and plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its proposed Westridge Meadows
subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developed at approximately 7700 West 3500 South in
unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat indicated a 40-foot highway dedication
at 3500 South Street running along the north boundary of BAM's property. BAM's fee simple
interest in the parcel proposed by subdivision development extended to the center line of 3500
South street at its north boundary.
On August 26, 1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake County
engineering staff, subject to compliance with County roadway standards, including a 40-foot
right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of 3500 South, which was and is a state highway,
running along the portion of BAM's proposed subdivision which abutted said highway.
The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County Ordinance

lr

This Statement of Facts adopts the "Findings of Fact" as entered by the trial court
[R. 266 - 269], which the County maintains is a correct and complete statement of the
material facts. The trial court's factual findings are not challenged in BAM's appeal.
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15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801. The County ordinance
requires dedication of highway ROW space by developers of abutting property in accordance
with the County's "Transportation Master Plan."
The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations from the Wasatch Front
Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation in formulating its Transportation
Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the Wasatch Front Regional Council were
based upon a long-range transportation study projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake
County to the year 2020.
Prior to receiving final subdivision approval from the County, BAM closed its purchase
of the proposed subdivision parcel, although BAM had entered into its purchase contract to
acquire the parcel subject to the contingency that it must receive County approval for its
proposed subdivision.
On September 15, 1997, the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] received
BAM's amended subdivision plan from the County for its approval. UDOT responded with a
required 53-foot half-width highway ROW on the portion of BAM's property abutting 3500
South.
On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed by the
Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway ROW for 3 500
South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot half-width). The County
then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its Transportation Master Plan.
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On or about June 15, 1998, the County transportation engineer approved BAM's
subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake County roadway standards,
including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of 3500 South.
On June 23,1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval to BAM's
amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street.
On July 2,1998, BAM's attorneyfileda Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40 feet. BAM's appeal did
not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed by the County.
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal.
On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved BAM's amended
subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-foot highway dedication..
On August 18,1999, the Board of County Commissioners grantedfinalapproval of the
Westridge subdivision plat (with the 53-foot highway dedication).
On August 27, 1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision.
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
1. The trial court correctly determined that the only issue which BAM made ripe for
adjudication by the district court - having been preserved pursuant to Utah statute and County
ordinance through exhaustion of remedies - was whether the County's increased requirement
of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40-foot dedication, effected an constitutional
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"taking."
2.

The trial court correctly determined that no unconstitutional "taking" of private

property without just compensation occurred in this case under the United States or Utah
constitutions where the County's highway dedication ordinance required dedication of property
pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive transportation scheme. The trial court also correctly
decided that the "takings" analyses applied in the United States Supreme Court's Nollan and
Dolan cases regarding development "exactions" are not applicable in this case.
3. The trial court correctly determined that no violation of the Equal Protection clause
of the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause of the Utah
Constitution, occurred in this case.
ARGUMENT
1
If BAM's Constitutional Challenge to the County Ordinance is Treated as
a "Facial" Challenge, BAM Has not Met the Heightened Standard Applied
to a Facial Challenge to a Municipal Ordinance
The threshold question on review is whether BAM's "takings" and "equal protection"
constitutional challenges are to be treated as "facial" challenges or "as-applied" challenges.
This distinction is crucial because it determines the mode of analysis, and level of judicial
scrutiny, to be applied.
BAM asserts that the County's subdivision approval and highway-dedication legislative
scheme is "facially flawed" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1, Sec.
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22 of the Utah Constitution2. While it is somewhat unclear whether BAM really intends to
challenge the ordinance facially or "as-applied" (inasmuch as BAM repeatedly asserts that the
County's subdivision approval condition which increased the required highway right-of-way
from 40 feet to 53-feet was "excessive"), the County maintains that BAM should be taken at
its word, as it expressly challenges the "facial" constitutionality of the ordinance3. Still, in due
caution, the County has responded to these attacks in both "facial" and "as-applied" contexts.
In a facial challenge, "...the challenger need not 'seek a final decision regarding the
application of the regulation to the property at issue before the government entity charged with
its implementation.9" Smith Investment Co, v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)(citation omitted). This is because a facial challenge to an ordinance is deemed ripe at the
moment of its enactment.
On the opposite hand, a facial challenger bears a "heavy burden" in attacking an
ordinance, even an "extraordinary one," because courts have a "strong reluctance" to proclaim
a municipal legislative act as facially invalid, and "will resolve any doubts in favor of the
ordinance's constitutionality." Id., 958 P.2d at 251 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Two enormous threshold obstacles beset BAM as a facial challenger in this case. First,
in 1992 the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 112 S.Ct.
2886 (1992) set forth the standard to be applied to a facial constitutionality challenge to a

2

Appellant's Brief, p. 11.

3

Id.,p. 11,11.5-6.
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municipal ordinance. It held that," [a] statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." '." Id. at 2894
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although BAM claims that the County ordinance in
question is facially unconstitutional, it does not - nor can it - make claim that it has been
deprived of all economically viable use of its property. On the contrary, BAM was able to make
full use of 44 of its originally planned 46 lots4, and was able to proceed with its subdivision,
which it "essentially completed.5"
In Smith Investment, supra, plaintiff-developer purchased a parcel zoned for commercial
construction. After building a shopping center on the portion of the parcel, the plaintiff
reserved the rear 15.8 acre portion of the parcel for future use. In the meantime, Sandy city
"downzoned" the reserved (rear) portion to residential use only. The plaintiff
brought a facial challenge against the City, asserting substantive due process and takings claims,
4

Appellant's Brief, p. 6,11. 4-5. This means that relinquishing the two lots, BAM
lost less than 5% of the value of its property (2 out of 46 lots is approximately 4.35%).
By comparison, the Smith Investment landowner lost "about 43%" of its land value
{Smith, supra, 958 P.2d at 259) yet that was not enough to convince the court that a taking
had occurred. In fact, the court here points out that "regulations causing much greater
diminution in value than that found here have been upheld against takings challenges."
(citing, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117,
71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheckv. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5% diminution); Pace Resources, Inc. v.
Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir.1987) (89.5%); William C Haas &
Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.1979) (95%); Sierra Terreno
v. Tahoe Regfl Planning Agency, 79 Cal.App.3d 439, 144 CaLRptr. 776, 777 (1978)
(81%). Id..
5

Id., p. 6.
Page 15 of 44

alleging - like BAM here - that the ordinance amendment was "economically 'unduly
oppressive/" Id., 958 P.2d at 255 (record citation omitted) . But this court responded by
holding that
"...even when land value i s substantially diminished as a result of zoning, that
fact alone will not be deemed a sufficient ground for finding the regulation
arbitrary and capricious. Such losses generally are deemed to be simply the
uncompensated burdens one must accept to live in an ordered society."
Id., 958 P.2d at 255-256. The Smith Investment court continued, "[w]here the zoning ordinance
appears to the court to be a generally sensible one, even a serious reduction in value may not
be sufficient to persuade the court that the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable." Id., 958
P.2d at 256.
Here, BAM has not even attempted to demonstrate that it was deprived of all
"economically viable" use of its parcel. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
BAM, it only shows that BAM lost - at most - 2 out of 46 building lots. The other 44 lots were
fully developed as planned. The alleged loss of two building lots is questionably sufficient to
even qualify as a "substantial" diminution in value, and even at that, under Smith Investment,
would not begin to undermine the authority of the County to regulate highway-width
dedications.
Second, BAM offered no evidence at trial, and does not even argue on appeal, that (a)
the County lacked a "legitimate governmental interest" in transportation corridor planning6, or

6

In fact, BAM concedes that the County has a valid interest in this area.
Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
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(b) that the highway dedication ordinance is "reasonably related" to such interest. See, Smith
Investment at 958 P.2d 252. As a facial takings challenger, BAM must carry the burden of
showing that the ordinance "does not advance legitimate state interests.95 See, Smith Investment,
958 P.2d at fn. 18; see also, Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385, 114 S.Ct. 2309,2316
(1994). But this proposition BAM has not even attempted to establish. Accordingly, BAM did
not and cannot meet its burden under a facial challenge to the County's highway-dedication
ordinance.
2
If BAM's Challenge is Treated as an "As-Applied" Challenge, then the Only
Issue which BAM Made Ripe for Adjudication by the District Court was
Whether the County's Increased Requirement of a 53-foot Highway
Dedication, Rather Than a 40-foot Dedication, Effected a Constitutional
"Taking"
In an "as-applied" constitutional challenge, it is well settled in federal takings
jurisprudence that a takings claim must be ripe before it may be presented for judicial
determination. In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
et. aU 121 S.Ct. 2448, 533 U.S. 606,150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001), the Court articulated its takings
ripeness rule as follows:
...a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the
opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach
of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness rules a taking claim based on a
law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends
upon the landowner's first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to
allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering
development plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any
variances or waiver allowed bylaw. As a general rule, until these ordinary
Page 17 of 44

procedures have been followed the extent of the restriction on property is not
known and the regulatory taking has not been established.
Id., 121 S.Ct. at 2459. It is imperative that before a takings claim may be addressed by a court,
"... the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reach a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). In
Palazzolo, the Supreme Court added that "[t]he central question is resolving the ripeness issue,
under Williamson County and other relevant decisions, is whether petitioner obtained a final
decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land." Palazzoloy supra, 121
S.Ct. at 2458 (emphasis added). In 1986 the United States District Court for the District of
Utah held that
[i]t is the view of this Court that plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not lie and in all events is premature. In Williamson [supra], the Court
observed that the Fifth Amendment does not require that just compensation be
paid in advance of or contemporaneously with a taking and that all that is
required is an adequate process and avenue for obtaining compensation [cite
omitted]. Plaintiffs have failed to show that actions otherwise available,
including this action without the § 1983 claim would not provide them with an
adequate remedy. . . . The United States Supreme Court noted in Williamson
that state procedures which permit a property owner to obtain just
compensation must be utilized before bringing a §1983 claim.. Plaintiffs
correctly have argued that procedures which allow a property owner to obtain
a declaratory judgment need not be first exhausted; but since no constitutional
violation occurs under the fifth Amendment until just compensation has been
denied, state procedures that allow a property owner to obtain compensation
for a taking do need to be exhausted."
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 634 F. Supp. 100, 106 (1986). BAM asserts that the
trial court erred in finding that the only claim BAM was able to bring before it was for the
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allegedly unconstitutionally excessive exaction of requiring an increased highway road-width
dedication of 53 feet (measured from the center of the relevant highway, i.e., 3500 South
street). As the trial court concluded,
"since the only issue appealed by BAM to the County Board of
Commissioners, and thus preserved by exhaustion of administrative remedies,
was the County's requirement of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than a
40-foot dedication, that is the only issue properly before this Court."
[R. 266 - 273 (Conclusions of Law, Ijl)7]. BAM asserts that "the 'exhaustion of remedies'
requirement does not apply to cases brought under 42 USC § 1983 ."8 Appellants Brief, p. 45.
While this is generally true, BAM misses the point. The "ripeness" and "exhaustion"
doctrines, while distinct, are very closely related in a takings claim. This is because under
Palazzolo and Williamson County, exhaustion of remedies only occurs when the land-use
authority has rendered a "final decision" on the landowner's application. Only then is a
takings case ripe for judicial review. Hence, a landowner must exhaust his administrative
remedies, thereby obtaining a "final decision," before a case will attain ripeness. Id..
Here, however, BAM never sought or obtained a final decision from the County

7

It is unclear from the trial court record whether the trial court treated BAM's
claims as a "facial" or "as-applied" challenge.
8

BAM also asserts that the trial court improperly applied a "notice of claim" requirement.
Appellant's Brief, p. 46. The County is at a loss in responding to this argument. The County
never raised any defense based upon, nor did the trial court ever rely upon, any "notice of
claim" provision contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann., Sec.
63-30-1, et. seq.) or elsewhere.
Page 19 of 44

regarding any claim except its objection to the increase in the road-width requirement from
40 feet to 53 feet. See Statement of Facts, TflO, supra, and R. 266-269. Under the "ripeness"
doctrine, the scope of the legal issues presented to the trial court was defined and limited by
the extent to which BAM preserved its claims through exhaustion of its administrative
remedies, and received a "final decision" from the County on those claims. Also see, Utah
Code. Ann Sec. 17-27-1001(a)9. BAM followed the appeal procedure outlined in the Utah
statute and corresponding Salt Lake County Ordinance provision, but chose only to appeal
the issue of the increased right-of-way (ROW) requirement {i.e., the 53 foot half-width) in
the County Planning Commission's preliminary approval of BAJVTs amended 44-lot plat
{see, Statement of Facts, supra, ^fl[ 7, 8 and 9; also see R., Plaintiffs Trial Ex. # 23). BAM's
"Notice of Appeal" to the County Board of Commissioners (id.) simply stated that BAM
"hereby appeals... from that certain June 23rd [1998] decision of the Salt Lake
County Planning and Zoning Commission (sic), denying 'development
approval' for the above-referenced subdivision development with the 3500
9

Sec. 17-27-1001 Appeals.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county rs land use decisions
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this
chapter until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with
the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
j|e $

$

$

$

(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid, and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
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South Street roadway at the '40-foot half-width right-of-way.5"
Although it now attempts to assert a claim for the "excessive" costs it was required
to pay for standard subdivision improvements, BAM's administrative appeal did not
challenge any other requirement imposed by the County for approval of BAM's proposed
subdivision such as improvement costs for customary and legally required items10 such as
sidewalk, curb and gutter, fencing, etc.. Thus, the only issue raised on administrative appeal
by BAM was the increase in the ROW from 40 to 53 feet. Since no other issues were
appealed to the Board of Commissioners, no other issues received a "final decision" by the
County. Therefore, the only issue ripe for judicial review was whether the increase in the
required ROW (highway dedication)from 40 feet to 53 feet was "arbitrary, capricious or
illegal" (Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-100l(3)(b).) Accordingly, the trial court correctly
concluded that no issue other than the increased highway dedication requirement was
properly presented in BAM's action.

10

Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Section 18.24, "Required Improvements."
Regardless of where the required road-width dedication had been established, BAM
would still be required by County ordinance to install storm drains, fencing, curb &
gutter, sidewalk, etc.. Sec. 18.24 provides for the improvements which generally will be
required of a subdivision developer as a condition of plat approval. They include storm
and sanitary sewer systems (Sec. 18.24.020, 025); storm drainage (18.24.030); street
improvements (18.24.040); underground utility lines (18.24.060); pavement (18.24.080);
curb & gutter (18.24.090);closure of ditches and canals (18.24.130,140); and solid
fencing "where lots rear on a public street" (as occurred here) (18.24.145). The required
improvements must be completed (or a fee paid for, or performance bond accepted in lieu
of actual completion) as a condition precedent to recordation of a final plat (18.24.010,
170, 190).
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3
No Unconstitutional "Taking" of Private Property Without Just
Compensation Occurred in This Case; The "Takings" Analyses Applied
in the Supreme Court's Nollan and Dolan Cases are not Applicable Here
The trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that dedications required of a
subdivision developer in order to comply with the County's highway-dedication ordinance
are qualitatively different than the exactions analyzed in the cases relied upon by BAM, and
that the County effected no "taking."11. The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here,
involves a generally applicable legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is
imposed individually. This distinction is crucial to determining the proper level of scrutiny
to be applied to the County's ordinance. First, it is necessary to review the statutory scheme
under which the County derives its authority to regulate highway dedications.
(A) Utah's Statutory Scheme for County Regulation of Subdivision Development
Utah state statute grants authority to the counties for regulating development of

11

BAM misleadingly suggests that the County "acknowledged" a taking of private
property. See Appellant's Brief, (Summary of Appellant's Arguments, ^3), p. 7-8: "The
County's own witnesses, without rebuttal, acknowledged that the Plaintiffs property had
been taken." BAM is referring to the trial testimony of Gary Ladel [R. 354 (internal pp. 236271)], County staff appraiser, and his appraisal report [Trial Exhibit D-50], which placed the
value of the raw land exacted by reason of the increase in the highway dedication from 40
to 53 feet value at $12,150. This testimony was offered, of course, merely to limit BAM's
damages only in the event that it were first concluded by the trial court that the County
exacted an illegal "taking." This trial evidence obvious did not constitute an admission of
liability.
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subdivisions within their boundaries. First, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-102(1) confers a
general grant of authority to counties to regulate land use:
To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, and in order to provide for the
health, safety, and welfare,... counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions,
and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land
within th county, including ordinances... governing [land] uses, density, open
spaces, structures, buildings,... [and] transportation ...
(Emphasis added). Chapter 27 creates express power in the counties to regulate and approve
development of subdivisions. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 17-27-801 provides as follows:
Enactment of subdivision ordinance.
The legislative body of any county may enact a subdivision ordinance
requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision
ordinance and be approved as required by this part before:
(1) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office; and
(2) lots may be sold.
Subsection 807 requires that the recordation of an approved final subdivision plat acts
as a dedication of the streets specified therein for public use:
Dedication of streets.
(1) Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded according to the
procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and
other public places\ and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the county for
the public for the uses named or intended in those plats.
(Emphasis added). Under the authority of the foregoing statutes, Salt Lake County enacted
its Subdivision Ordinance (Chap. 18, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances ["SLCCO"]).
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The Subdivision Ordinance provides a comprehensive scheme for application, review and
approval of a subdivision, and contains numerous provisions specifically applicable to the
instant case. First, Sec. 18.08.010 provides the general outline for subdivision application
and approval procedure. In conjunction with the subdivision ordinance, the County in this
case was required to apply its highway-dedication ordinance (SLCCO Sec. 15.28.010). That
ordinance provides in relevant part as follows:
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required.
"... no building or structure shall be erected, reconstructed, structurally altered
or enlarged, and no building permit shall be issued therefor, on any lot or
parcel of land which abuts a major or secondary highway, as shown on the
map entitled, 'Official Major and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County/
... or other public street which does not conform to current county width
standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel within the right-of-way of
the highway to be widened or additional required street width has been
dedicated to the county and improved."
(Emphasis added). Thus, under its ordinance, the County cannot approve a subdivision plan
that does not dedicate sufficient highway right-of-way to conform to "current county [road]
width standards." Id.. There is no issue in this case as to whether the County varied from
the terms of its own ordinances. BAM has never claimed in this case that the County either
failed to apply, or exceeded the scope of, its own ordinances. Rather, it appears that BAM's
claims is that the combination of the County's subdivision ordinance and the highway-
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dedication ordinance12 work a "taking" of private property in a facially unconstitutional
manner13.
Before BAM submitted its amended 44-lot subdivision plat in compliance with the
Planning Commission's first preliminary approval, the County had adopted a modification
of its "Transportation Master Plan" map14. Consequently, when the Planning Commission
gave its preliminary approval to BAM's amended plat, it incorporated the updated 53-foot
ROW in compliance with Ordinance Sec. 15.28.010. The County took this action because
under its own ordinance, it was required to. It was necessary to apply the ordinance to BAM
solely because BAM's property abutted a highway.
(B)

The County Subdivision and Highway Dedication Ordinances are a Valid
Police Power Land-Use Regulation, Not a "Taking"

There is a surprising dearth of case law, either state or federal, addressing the
"takings" issue in the specific context of a municipal highway-dedication or subdivision
ordinances. This issue certainly appears to be one of first impression in Utah.
BAM's bedrock argument is that a development "exaction" (i.e., the highway12

Referred to hereinafter collectively as the highway-dedication ordinance.

13

Though, as discussed below, it is less than crystal clear whether BAM really
intends to attack the ordinance "facially" or "as-applied."
14

Undisputed trial testimony established that the "Transportation Master Plan
Map," though under different nomenclature, is the same thing as the "Official Major and
Secondary Highway Plan, Salt Lake County" referenced in the Ordinance. See, Statement
of Facts, supra, fJ ; Trial testimony of Andrea Pullos [R. 353 (internal p. 157,1. 24 - p.
158,1.180)].
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dedication requirement) is unconstitutional when it is not "roughly proportionate" to the
anticipated impact of the particular development upon municipal infrastructure and services.
This, asserts BAM, requires an "individualized determination" ofthe proportionality between
the exaction and the impact. BAM relies chiefly upon four cases in support of its argument
that the combination of the County's highway dedication and subdivision improvements15
requirements effect an constitutionally "excessive" exaction, amounting to a "taking." At
the state level, BAM cites Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (1979) ["CallF] and
614 P.2d 1257 (1980) ["Call IF], and Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). As federal constitutional authority, BAM cites two U.S. Supreme
Court opinions, Nollan v. Calif Coastal Comm., 483 US 825, 107 S.Ct 3141 (1987) and
Dolanv. City ofTigard,5l2US 374,114S.Ct2309(1994).

The County agrees with BAM's

recitation of the facts and holdings of these cases, but not with its application of their
principles to this case. As was determined by the trial court [R. 271 ] and as will be analyzed
below, BAM's case authority is simply inapposite to this case because it employs an
inappropriate analytical model for constitutional scrutiny of a municipal highway-dedication
ordinance.
Call I and Call II upheld the constitutionality of a city ordinance which required

15

However, the County maintains that BAM's challenge to the ordinance-required
"improvements" (e.g., storm sewer drain connections, curb and gutter, sidewalk, fencing,
etc.[see, Complaint [R. 1-13],fflf17, 32] is not ripe due to BAM's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies on that issue.
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subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed subdivision land (or pay the cash equivalent) to be
used by the city for flood control and/or recreational facilities. 606 P.2d at 220-221; 614
P.2d at 258. These cases jointly hold that such an ordinance is not unconstitutional on its
face (614 P.2d at 1258), and that"... [a] dedication should have some reasonable relationship
to the needs created by the subdivision." 606 P.2d at 220; 614 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis
added). Similarly, Banberry addressed "takings"claims by three subdividers involving a
city's water connection and park improvement fees. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that
while such fees were not unlawful per se and the law generally requires that a municipality
equitably allocate the costs for such things as water services and park improvements as
between subdividers and other landowners, the reasonableness of a particular dedication or
fee must be resolved on the facts of each case. 631 P2d at 901-902.
Nollan invalidated a proposed exaction in the form of a public-access easement
across the landowner's private beach where the landowner's beach was situated between two
areas of public beach. The easement had been mandated as a condition of the landowner's
building permit application to construct a beach house. Similarly, in Dolan, the city required
a dedication of a portion of Dolan's property, which laid within a flood plain, for
improvement of a storm drainage system. Thus, the exactions required in these cases were
specifically related to the unique, individual characteristics of the properties involved, and
the unique impacts ofthe individual proposed developments. Dolan refined the U.S. Supreme
Court's earlier Nollan holding, requiring that a dedication applied specially to an individual
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development requires an "individualized determination" that there is a "rough
proportionality" (though not necessarily based on a "precise mathematical calculation")
between the dedication being exacted and the nature and extent of the impact of the proposed
development. Dolan, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309,2319.
All four cases cited by BAM are readily distinguishable from the instant case in that
they concern exactions mandated in response to individual impact characteristics which were
unique to the developments in each case. In this case, however, the County highwaydedication requirement operates independently of any unique characteristics or proposed uses
of specific parcels to which it applies. As with any subdivider who chooses to develop a
parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required here simply to comply with a uniform
legislative scheme which expects similarly situated subdividers16 to dedicate highway rightsof-way consistent with current uniform road-width standards.
Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community development
occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, under
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-width requirements for new construction along
major traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size,
usage, and other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, the BAM
doctrine would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located along
16

"Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property
which abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec.
15.28.010
Page 28 of 44

the side of a highway.

Rather than having roadway segments with even and consistent

widths, road edges and shoulders would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting
parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's impact. The absurd
and nightmarish practical consequences of this notion are obvious.
However, while BAM correctly perceives the County's highway-dedication ordinance
as a generalized "location-based" exaction, as opposed to an individualized "impact-based"
exaction17 like those in the cases upon which BAM relies, it still insists that the County's
ordinance must pass muster under the "individualized" Nollan/Dolan approach.
This distinction is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional review.
In the recent California Supreme Court case of San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of
San Francisco,41 P.3d87,27Cal.4 th 643,117Cal.Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), this very distinction
was discussed at length, and specifically in the context of'the Nollan/Dolan "proportionality"
analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city permit to convert a long-term rental
housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility. The city imposed a "housing
replacement" exaction which required plaintiff- and all other residential hotel conversion
applicants - to provide replacement comparable residential housing units or pay an in lieu
fee to a city-administered fund. Id., 41 P.3d at 92. The court distinguished the replacement-

17

BAM repeatedly argues that a uniform "location-based" approach is "WRONG!
WRONG! WRONG!" because it doesn't fit into the Nollan/Dolan "individualized
determination" analysis. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, pp. 1,7,8, 11, 18, 35. BAM
obstinately attempts to force a square conceptual peg into a round analytical hole.
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housing exaction from an "ad hoc" individualized recreation fee imposed by a municipality
on condominium developer which it previously invalidated18.

The San Remo court noted

that in its earlier case, the city had
"relied on no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no
legislatively set formula to calculate its size [;] the [fee] condition was
imposed ad hoc, entirely at the discretion of the city council and staff."
Id., 41 P.3d at 104 (citingEhrlich supra, 911 P.2d at 434-435). By contrast, San Francisco's
housing-replacement exaction in San Remo, which the court ultimately upheld, was a
"'generally applicable development fee or assessment *** imposed not 'individually9 but
'pursuant to an ordinance or rule of general applicability.999 Id., 41 P.3d at 105 (emphasis in
original). The court added that, "[t]he 'sine qua nort for application of Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny is thus the 'discretionary deployment of the police power9 in 'the imposition of landuse conditions in individual cases99 (id., 41 P.3d at 105 (citation omitted)), reasoning that
"[w]hile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of improper leveraging [by a
municipality], such generally applicable legislation is subject to the ordinary restraints of the
democratic political process19.99 Id.. Thus the court upheld the housing-replacement scheme,
affording a "deferential99 level of scrutiny to the city's "generally legislated99 exaction
scheme.
"See, Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 12 Cal.4th 854 (Cal. 1996).
19

Similarly, in the present case, BAM's remedy for what it perceives as unfair
County subdivision development conditions (if any remedy is appropriate) is a legislative
remedy, not a judicial one.
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Here, the County's highway-dedication ordinance is just such a generally-applicable
legislative scheme, uniformly imposing a regulatory standard for road-width dedication by
subdivision developers. These standards are designed to ensure that new subdivisions which
abut major or secondary highways will conform to current highway width and design
standards as part of a regional transportation plan designed to accommodate future
community growth and traffic demands.
Consequently, the highway-dedication requirement necessarily affects only those
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway20.

The ordinance utilizes

a legislatively adopted "formula" that standardizes road-width dedication based upon the
size, location, type, and projected traffic volume of each highway in the county. The exaction
in this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on an individualized
basis at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors attributable
exclusively to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, the
County highway-dedication ordinance
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners
who choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway
[and] the assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not
individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable
County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners
whose property abutted 3500 South."
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 [R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny

20

County Code of Ordinances, 15.28.010
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on review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests."
Courts have long struggled with drawing a distinction between a valid, police powerbased regulatory action and a compensable "taking." The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
admitted that it has "'... been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action' must be deemed
a compensable taking." Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164,175,110 S.Ct. 383,390
(1979), qaotmgPenn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124,98 S.Ct. 2646,
2659 (1978). Three factors prescribed by the Court to guide the takings analysis include (a)
the character of the governmental action; (b) its economic impact; and (c) its interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 SCt
2862,2874, 81 LEd 815 (1984).
In a case analogous to the instant case, involving a imposition of drainage
improvement costs upon a railroad, the North Dakota Supreme Court employed the Monsanto
analysis in Southeast Cass Water Resource District v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 527
N.W. 884 (N.Dakota 1995). There the court upheld a statute which permitted water districts
to impose costs for changing railway bridges and culverts to accommodate drainage as a
valid police-power regulation, and not a taking, even though it created substantial expense
to the railroad. The court noted that in Monsanto, the Supreme Court found that the chemical
maker "... could not successfully challenge 'the ability of the Federal Government to regulate
the marketing and use of pesticides,' because 'such [police-power] restrictions are the
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burdens we all must bear in exchange for the 'advantage of living and doing business in a
civilized community.9" Id., 527 N.W.2d at 895, quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007. The
North Dakota court also distinguished Nollan and Dolan. It quoted Dolan for the proposition
that "... [a] land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interest' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."
527 N. W.2d at 896, quoting Dolan, 114 SCt at 2316 (citations omitted). The North Dakota
court concluded that "...BN Railroad's duty in this case arises not from a municipal
'adjudicative decision to condition,' but rather from an express and general legislated duty
under a constitutional reservation of police power over a corporation." 527 NW2d at 896.
Similarly, the ordinance at issue here is not a "adjudicative" action peculiar to BAM's
property creating unique development conditions, but rather, it is a "generally legislated
duty" the creation of which was expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature.
Accordingly, the County maintains that in a challenge to a legislatively adopted landuse regulation generally affecting similarly situated (e.g., highway-abutting) landowners, the
proper constitutional inquiry is whether or not BAM has met its burden of demonstrating
either that (a) the ordinance fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest, or (b) that
is deprived BAM of all economically viable use of its land. Finally, BAM cannot possibly
claim (and hasn't claimed)that the County's ordinance thwarted its "reasonable, investmentbacked expectations" since BAM purchased the parcel with full knowledge of the ordinance.
Inasmuch as BAM has not argued, or attempted to prove, either such proposition, the trial
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court's decision upholding the ordinance and dismissing BAM's takings claims should be
affirmed.
(C)

BAM's Reliance on Two State Statutes in Misplaced

BAM incorrectly asserts21 that two Utah statutes "undermine" the county's application
of the highway-dedication ordinance, i.e., the Utah Impact Fees Act22 and the Private
Property Protection Act23. Neither of these statutes applies to this case.
BAM argues that under the Utah Impact Fees Act the County is precluded from
assessing a "road impact fee" for the improvement of state or federal highways24. This may
be true, but it is irrelevant. First, the act only governs "impact fees," which it defines as "a
payment of money imposed upon development activity as a condition of development

21

Appellant's Brief, pp. 27 - 33. Apparently, BAM now cites these statutes for the first time
as "persuasive authority." BAM has never attempted to rely on these statues in asserting any
cause of action in this lawsuit, and these issues were not raised below and the trial court was
never given the opportunity of ruling on the viability of this new argument. The County
believes that this Court should deem this argument as having been waived for the purposes
of this appeal. See, State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795,798 (Utah 2000) (an appellate court generally
should not review any issue that was not raised in the court below based on the principle that
it is unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given
the opportunity to consider); see also, State v. Pecht, 441 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,4 (Utah 2002)
(generally a party who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from asserting
it on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error).
22

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-36-101, et seq..

23

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90-1, et seq..

24

Appellant's Brief, pp. 27.
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approval25." AS BAM concedes, Salt Lake County does not charge road impact fees, and
such fees were never at issue below. Second, BAM infers from the provision defining
"roadway facilities" as those "not funded by the state or federal government26" that costs for
"road improvement"for a state-owned road (such as the relevant road in this case) must be
bom by the state, not the County. Again, whether this is correct or not, it is also irrelevant
for the same reason, since the County did not levy as "road impact fee" on BAM. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 27-28.
The Private Property Protection Act similarly is of no avail to BAM since by its
express terms it only applies to actions of a "state agency27."
4

No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, or the "Uniform Operation of Laws" Clause of the Utah
Constitution, Occurred Here
In essence, BAM claims that enforcement of the County highway-dedication
ordinance, works a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
equivalent "Uniform Operation of Laws" clause of Utah Constitution because it
"discriminates" against developers whose land abuts a major or secondary highway, requiring

25

Utah Code Ann. Sec. ll-36-102(7)(a).

26

Utah Code Ann. Sec. ll-36-102(13)(b)(ii)

27

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-90-2 (2)(a)(i).
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that such a developer dedicate land in accordance with the Master Plan, whereas adjacent
subdivision developers - whose residents also may impact traffic load on such highways - do
not have to absorb any of the cost of such dedication and improvements simply because their
land does not abut a highway. The trial court was unpersuaded by this argument, finding that
the County's subdivision/highway dedication scheme passed "rational basis" constitutional
muster under Bd. of Trustees of Univ. ofAlabamav. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001)28. While
in Garrett the Court primarily addressed the Eleventh Amendment immunity of states against
federal court suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act29, it did so through the lens of
its traditional "rational-basis" equal protection analysis. The Court reiterated its prior
holdings that
[u]nder rational-basis review, where a group possesses 'distinguishing
characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement,'
a State's decision to act on the basis of these differences does not give rise to
a constitutional violation (citations omitted). Moreover, the State need not
articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather the
burden is on the challenging party to negative "'any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'"
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
121 S.Ct. at 963-964. BAM alleges that the County's subdivision approval and highway
dedication scheme creates a "classification" which discriminates against subdivision
developers whose property abuts a major or secondary highway and places a disparate burden

'Conclusions of Law, p [R. 272]
121 S.Ct. at 961 -962
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upon such developers by requiring them to dedicate land to conform to road-width standards.
Accordingly, it is BAM's burden here to demonstrate that there is no "any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."
BAM hasn't even attempted to show a lack of rational basis for this classification.
Even so, the County maintains that (a) it has a clearly "legitimate governmental interest" in
regulating subdivision development in a manner consistent with long-range transportation
planning standards. Further, there is a clear rational basis for the County's road-width ROW
dedication requirements as applied to subdivision developers whose land abuts a highway
which is subject to the County's transportation master plan.
Moreover, a developer with highway-abutting land knows, or reasonably should
know, of the dedication and improvement requirements, as they are inherent in the interface
between the land and the abutting highway. Thus, the developer can have no "reasonable
investment-backed expectation" that such a cost would not be required. Such a developer
voluntarily elects to purchase highway-abutting property.
BAM's self-depiction in this case as a victim of abusive or "insensitive"30 local
government exactions is disingenuous. As an experienced subdivision developer, BAM was
well aware that subdivision approvals are universally conditioned on dedication of roadwidth ROWs where a subdivision parcel abuts a highway. According to the trial testimony

'Appellant's Brief, pp. 32, 33.
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of BAM's president, Scott McCleary, he had been a developer for 20 years and had built
some 2000 homes in the Wasatch Front area31. There are obvious compensatory economic
benefits for a subdivision developer in owning a parcel which abuts a major highway, which
a nearby subdivider whose land is more remote from the highway do not enjoy (e.g., ease of
public access from the adjacent thoroughfare; visibility and exposure of location to the public
as a marketing edge; relatively short and direct access to highway-routed utilities such as
water and sewer main lines, which reduce a developer's costs for acquisition of easements,
installation of extended underground lines, etc.). As the trial court observed32, these are all
factors which a developer considers in determining the economic viability of a prospective
subdivision project. But in the real world, such commercial advantages also have a cost; in
this case, the cost is the highway-dedication requirement. Apparently, BAM expected to
enjoy the economic benefits of the convenient, accessible and conspicuous location of its
subdivision, without incurring any of the attendant costs.
In this case, the County clearly has a "rational basis" for differentiating between
highway-abutting landowners and those who do not own highway-abutting property in order
to effectuate its long-range transportation planning scheme. Further, BAM has not shown
(or even suggested) that highway-abutting landowners comprise a traditionally recognized
"suspect classification" entitled to heightened equal protection scrutiny. BAM's equal

31

R. 353 (internal p. 77,11. 5-18).

32

Memorandum Decision, p. 4 [R. 250]
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protection theory is wholly misguided.
For the same reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that BAM's Utah
constitutional "uniform operation of laws"33 theory is of no impact here. In Little America
Hotel Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 785 P2d 1106 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City in a challenge to the City's "Innkeeper's
License Tax."

Applying a three-step analytical model, the Court found that (a) the

classification (innkeepers) was not unreasonable; (b) that it was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective (raising revenue); and (c) that the means by which that
objective is pursued are reasonable (a special tax). The Court finally noted that "...[t]he City
has no burden to create classifications with logical precision or guarantees of equality." Id.,
785 P2d at 1108.
Under the Little America analysis, the highway-dedication ordinance at issue here
operates as a reasonable measure by the County to advance a legitimate governmental
interest, i.e., implementation of a long-range transportation plan. In fact, that the County's
interest in transportation planning was sensibly advanced by the ordinance is substantiated
by the fact that its master plan was based upon the Wasatch Front Regional Council's
comprehensive traffic study and highway-width recommendations which projected Salt Lake

33

Ut. Const., Art. I, Sec. 24: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
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County transportation needs to the year 202034. Accordingly, BAM's "uniform operation"
theory was correctly rejected by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
First, it is difficult to ascertain from BAM's brief whether its challenge to the
County's highway-dedication ordinance is "facial" or "as-applied." This distinction
determines the applicable level of scrutiny and the scope of issues ripe for appeal. The
county maintains that by its own assertion, BAM's challenge is "facial." If BAM's
constitutional challenge to the County ordinance is treated as a facial challenge, BAM has
not met the heightened standard applied to a facial challenge to a municipal ordinance. It has
not shown (or argued) either that the County's ordinance does not advance a legitimate
governmental interest, or that the ordinance deprived BAM of all economically viable use
of its land. On the other hand, if BAM's constitutional challenge to the County ordinance
is treated as an "as-applied" challenge, then the only issue which BAM made ripe for
adjudication whether the County's requirement of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than
a 40-foot dedication, effected a constitutional "taking."
Secondly, no unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation
occurred in this case. As the trial court concluded, the "takings" analyses applied in the
Supreme Court's Nollan and Dolan cases are not applicable in this case. The "individualized

Statement of Facts, supra, ^[19.
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determination" of the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality" standard does not apply to a
generally applied legislative land-use scheme, as occurred here. The County ordinance at
issue here applied equally and even-handedly to all highway-abutting subdividers, and was
not the product of an "ad hoc" individualized discretionary act. Therefore, it is not subject
to the Nollan/Dolan "rough proportionality" test at all. Rather, the party challenging the
ordinance must show that the ordinance is not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest, which BAM has not even attempted to do.
Third, Utah's statutory scheme for county regulation of subdivision development
expressly permits the requirement of highway dedication as a condition to subdivision
approval. The County's subdivision and highway dedication ordinances are a valid police
power land-use regulation entitled to "deferential" judicial scrutiny, not a constitutional
"taking" of private property.
Fourth, BAM's reliance on two state statutes {i.e., the Utah Impact Fees Act and Utah
Private Property Protection Act) is substantively misplaced. These statutes do not apply to
the facts of this case. Further, these claims are now raised for the first time on appeal, and
should therefore be deemed waived.
Finally, no violation of the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution,
or the "Uniform Operation of Laws" clause of the Utah Constitution, occurred in this case.
The County's ordinance draws a rational classification of similarly situated property owners.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed all claims against the County. The
Page 41 of 44

trial court's judgment should therefore be affirmed.

DATED this

£-.

day of May, 2002.
DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

DON
SEN
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and complete copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was:
Mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid
to:
Stephen G. Homer, Esq.
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan UT 84088
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
On this

T

day of

H/iflf

_, 200_
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Trial Court "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
And Order," Judge Timothy Hanson, June 30,2001
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.A.N. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah :
limited liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

i

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 980908157
s

vs.
s
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah,

:
s

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on April
23 and 24, 2001. Representatives for the plaintiff and defendant
were present and represented by counsel.
opening arguments.

The parties waived

The plaintiff presented its case and rested.

The defendant offered evidence in support of its defenses and the
defendant rested. Following closing arguments on May 21, 2001, the
Court took the matter under advisement.
Since taking the matter under advisement, the Court has
reviewed the exhibits, examined the legal authorities cited by
counsel in support of their respective positions, and considered
the testimony offered during the course of the trial.

The Court

being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.

B.A.M. V.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

&ggAi, asawTs
The plaintiff has presented this Court with a number of issues
concerning the constitutionality of certain Min-kind exactions,H
which the plaintiff alleges were conditions of its development
approval.

The defendant, however, has pointed out that the scope

of the legal issues properly before this Court are substantially
narrowed by the fact that the plaintiff only appealed the Planning
Commissions increase in ROW requirement from 40 foot half-width
(not 33 feet, as the plaintiff now claims) to 53 foot half-width.
Since the plaintiff's appeal to the County Board of Commissioners
was

limited

to

this

narrow

jurisdiction

to

consider

the

issue,

this

plaintiff's

Court

is

argument

without
that

the

improvements it allegedly was required to make as a condition for
approval are unconstitutional and illegal.

The Court therefore

considers only whether the defendant's required dedication of 53
feet is constitutional and otherwise legal.
The plaintiff contends that this case arises in the special
context of exactions, where the defendant has conditioned the
approval of the plaintiff's proposed development on the dedication
of 53 feet of property for public use. Moreover, the plaintiff's
position is that because the condition requiring the dedication of
53 feet of property is excessive, the Court should apply the

B.A.M. V.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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"rough-proportionality11 test of Dolan v. City of Ticrard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994).
In reviewing Dolan and Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107
S.Ct. 3141 (1987), the Court is not persuaded that these cases
apply to a municipal highway dedication ordinance which requires
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive
transportation scheme.

To the contrary, these cases apply to a

narrow class of cases where regulatory bodies use their police
power

on

an

extortionate

individual
manner

to

and

discretionary

exact

basis

unconstitutional

approval and issuance of development permits.
highway

ordinance

in

this

case

imposes

and

in

an

conditions

to

In contrast, the

the

requirement

of

dedication on a broad class of property owners who choose to
develop

property

Furthermore, the

which

abuts

assessment

a major

or

secondary

of how much property

highway.

had

to be

dedicated was not individualized, but rather was made pursuant to
the generally applicable County Transportation Master Plan and
applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted 3500
South. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Dolan analysis is
not applicable to this case.
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the plaintifffs Equal
Protection and Uniform Operation of Laws arguments.
above, the dedication

ordinance is applied

As stated

uniformly

on all

B.A.M. V.
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developers of highway-abutting land. The plaintifffs argument that
this geography-based approach treats individuals who are similarly
situated differently

is simply

incorrect.

For instance, the

developers of Elusive Meadows are not similarly situated because
their land does not abut a highway.

The ordinance clearly cannot

require such a developer to dedicate land which it does not own.
At the same time, the developers of Elusive Meadows do not have the
same economic advantages as the plaintiff because they do not have
the visibility, exposure, etc.

Moreover, the ordinance passes

constitutional muster under the "rational basis" standard recently
articulated by the Supreme Court in Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). As the defendant points
out, there is a "rational basis" for treating owners of highwayabutting property differently in order to effectuate the County's
long-range transportation plan.

For the same reasons, the

plaintiff's "uniform operation of laws" theory fails as a matter of
law.

The Court has reviewed the case of Little America Hotel

Corp. v. Salt Lake City. 785 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1989), and finds that
the highway dedication ordinance complies with the analytical model
set forth in that case.
Finally, the Court concludes that in light of evidence adduced
at the trial, the plaintifffs theory of equitable estoppel fails as
a matter of law. Specifically, the plaintiff could not reasonably

B.A.M. V.
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rely upon the Countyfs Mpreliminary approval." It is clear after
reviewing

Section

18.12.030

of

the

County

Ordinance

that

••preliminary11 approval only gives the developer leeway to "proceed
with preparation of specifications for the minimum improvements .
. . and with the preparation of the final plat."

The plaintiff

could not reasonably rely on this conditional, preliminary approval
in deciding to close the purchase of the pre-subdivision parcel.
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of
equitable estoppel.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the
defendant on all counts. Counsel for the defendant is directed to
prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
all in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Decision. Counsel
for the defendant should submit the same to the counsel for the
plaintiff for his review as to form.

Any objections as to form

should be resolved between the parties before the documents are
submitted to the Court. Should there be objections to form of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders and Judgments that
cannot be resolved, the objector should file the Objection, in
writing, with the Court so that the Court will have before it the
Objection, the proposed Findings and the Response to the Objection,
if any, so the Court can review the Objection, the Response and the

B.A.M. V.
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proposed Findings and make a determination on any disputed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or foj^n of Order.
Dated this ft day of June,/2001.

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT? COURT JUDGE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, thisj^_
June, 2001:

Stephen 6. Homer
Attorney for Plaintiff
9225 S. Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Don Hansen
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

day of

EXHIBIT

b

DAVID E. YOCOM (USB #3581)
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
DON HANSEN (USB # 1332)
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3400
Salt Lake City UT 84190
Telephone: (801)468-2631
Facsimile: (801)468-2622
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and ORDER

Plaintiff
vs.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 980908157 CD
Judge Timothy Hanson

Defendant

The above captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on April 23 and 24,
2001. Plaintiff was represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq., and Defendant was represented by Don
Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. The parties waived opening argument. Following trial, the
parties were permitted to submit trial memoranda. Following the parties' submission of Plaintiff s
Trial Brief, Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Trial Brief and Plaintiffs Reply Brief, closing
arguments were heard on May 21,2001. The Court then took this matter and advisement, reviewed
the trial exhibits and testimony, and examined the memoranda submitted by the parties and the legal
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authorities cited therein.
The Court, being fully advised, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 30, 1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the
application and plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its proposed
Westridge Meadows subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developecLat approximately
7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat
indicated a 40-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street running along the north
boundary of BAM's property. BAM's fee simple interest in the parcel proposed by
subdivision development extended to the center line of 3500 South street at its north
boundary.

2.

On August 26, 1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake
County engineering staff, subject to compliance with County roadway standards,
including a 40-foot right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of 3500 South, which
was and is a state highway, running along the portion of BAM's proposed
subdivision which abutted said highway.

3.

The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County
Ordinance 15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801.
The County ordinance requires dedication of highway ROW space by developers of
abutting property in accordance with the County's Transportation Master Plan.

4.

The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations from the Wasatch
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Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation in formulating
its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the Wasatch
Front Regional Council were based upon a long-range transportation study projecting
highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the year 2020.
5.

Prior to receiving final subdivision approval from the County, BAM closed its
purchase of the proposed subdivision parcel, although BAM had entered into its
purchase contract to acquire the parcel subject to the contingency that it must receive
County approval for its proposed subdivision.

6.

On September 15,1997, the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] received
BAM's amended subdivision plan from the County for its approval.

UDOT

responded with a required 53-foot half-width highway ROW on the portion of
BAM's property abutting 3500 South.
7.

On or about June 10,1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed by the
Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway
ROW for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot
half-width). The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its
Transportation Master Plan.

8.

On or about June 15, 1998, the County transportation engineer approved BAM's
subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake County roadway
standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of 3500 South.

9.

On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval to
BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street.
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10.

On July 2, 1998, BAM's attorney filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning
Commission's dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40
feet. BAM's appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval
imposed by the County.

11.

On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal.

12.

On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved BAM's amended
subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-foot highway
dedication..

13.

On August 18, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of
the Westridge subdivision plat (with the 53-foot highway dedication).

14.

On August 27,1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter began construction of the subdivision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The jurisdiction of this Court to decide issues in this action is limited by Utah Code
Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001, which provides in relevant part that
(1) (n)o person may challenge in district court a county's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted all
administrative remedies.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered.
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(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
Additionally, Salt Lake County Ordinance 18.08.050 (A) provides that
(a)ny person shall have the right to appeal to the board of county
commissioners any decision rendered by the planning commission
under this chapter by filing a letter, stating the reasons for appeal,
with the board of county commissioners within ten days after the
planning commission decision. After receiving the appeal, the county
commission may affirm the planning commission decision, remand
the matter to the planning commission for further consideration, or set
a date for a hearing.
In this action, BAM challenges the required 53-foot highway dedication as well as
various other conditions of the subdivision approval imposed by the County, or
"exactions," such as installation of curb and gutter, paving, storm and sewer lines,
and other items. However, since the only issue appealed by BAM to the County
Board of Commissioners, and thus preserved by exhaustion of administrative
remedies, was the County's requirement of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than
a 40-foot dedication, that is the only issue properly before this Court. Therefore, the
Court considers only whether the County's required highway dedication of the 53feet is constitutional and otherwise legal.
2.

BAM does not contend, and did not attempt to prove at trial, that the County's
highway dedication requirements failed to conform to its applicable ordinances.
Rather, BAM contends that those ordinances, while followed here, work an
unconstitutional "taking" or property without just compensation. BAM relies chiefly
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upon, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct 3141 (1987) and Dolan v.
City ofTigard, 114 S.Ct 2309 (1994) for the proposition that the County must make
an "individualized determination" of exactions imposed on a land developer wherein
the exactions must be "roughly proportionate" to the impact of the proposed
development. See, Dolan, 114 S.Ct at 2319. This Court concludes, however, that
these cases do not apply to a municipal highway dedication ordinance which requires
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive transportation
scheme. To the contrary, these cases apply only to a narrow class of cases where
regulatory bodies use their police power on an individual and discretionary basis and
in an extortionate manner to exact unconstitutional conditions to approval and
issuance of development permits. In contrast, the County highway ordinance here
imposes the requirement of dedication upon a broad class of property owners who
choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway. See, County
Ordinance 15.28.010. Further, the assessment of how much property had to be
dedicated was not individualized, but rather was made pursuant to the generally
applicable County Transportation Master Plan and applied across the board to all
owners whose property abutted 3500 South. Thus, the Nollan and Dolan analyses
are not applicable to this case. Therefore, the Court concludes that BAM failed to
establish a cause of action on its "takings" claim.
3.

The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiffs Equal Protection and Uniform
Operation of Laws causes of action and supporting arguments. As stated above, the
dedication ordinance is applied uniformly on all developers of highway-abutting
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land.

Moreover, the ordinance passes constitutional muster under the "rational

basis" standard recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Bd. of Trustees of Univ.
of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). As the defendant points out, there is a
"rational basis" for treating owners of highway- abutting property differently in order
to effectuate the County's long-range transportation plan. For the same reasons, the
plaintiffs "uniform operation of laws" theory fails as a matter of law. The Court has
reviewed the case of Little America Hotel Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 785 P.2d 1106
(Utah 1989), and finds that the highway dedication ordinance complies with the
analytical model set forth in that case.
4.

Finally, the Court concludes that in light of evidence adduced at the trial, the
plaintiffs theory of equitable estoppel fails as a matter of law. Specifically, the
plaintiff could not reasonably rely upon the County's "preliminary approval. " It is
clear after reviewing Section 18.12.030 of the County Ordinance that "preliminary"
approval only gives the developer leeway to "proceed with preparation of
specifications for the minimum improvements . . . and with the preparation of the
final plat." The plaintiff could not reasonably rely on this conditional, preliminary
approval in deciding to close the purchase of the pre-subdivision parcel. Accordingly,
the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of equitable estoppel.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the defendant on all counts.
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that no cause of action is found against Defendant Salt Lake County on any
claim set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, and said Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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Judgment shall enter accordingly.

Dated this

50 day of

,2001.

r

TIMOTHY R. H;
District Court Judged

Approved as to form:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

Plaintiff
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 980908157 CD
Judge Timothy Hanson

Defendant

The above captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on April 23 and 24, and
Mar 18,2001. Plaintiff was represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq., and Defendant was represented
by Don Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. The Court, being fully advised, and having entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein, now enters its JUDGMENT as follows:
The Court finds in favor of the defendant on all counts, and determines that no cause of
action is found against Defendant Salt Lake County on any claim set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint,
and said Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. No costs awarded.
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Dated this

5o

<::

,2001.

^^ day of

Approved as to form:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Plaintiff
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